Interconnected Conflicts: The Risk of a New Thirty Years' War. By Rubin Rothler - LLB, MLB
The interlinked nature of third-party involvement in the ongoing conflicts in Iran and Ukraine has increasingly come to the fore in recent weeks. It emerged that China has not only been providing Iran with radar systems, navigation tools, and electronic warfare technology, but also high-resolution satellite imagery and geospatial data to direct its rockets.
The same great-power relationships that are shaping the Middle East are affecting the conduct and constraints of the war in Ukraine. It is apparent that a reciprocation in kind is dictating Russia's conduct towards the US in Iran. Intelligence and targeting support mirror similar U.S. assistance to Ukraine. But this picture becomes murkier when considering the backroom accommodations Trump is willing to give Putin.
Recently, Trump pressured Zelensky to stop targeting Russian diesel infrastructure, saying the attacks were causing a shortage of the fuel that is "hurting the world." The U.S. national average price for diesel, which is used by trucks, trains, ships, and farm equipment, rose above six dollars a gallon for the first time last Thursday. Such interventions demonstrate how developments on the battlefield in Ukraine can no longer be considered independently of wider economic and geopolitical calculations.
China has been using tankers that are already at sea, when that runs out the American blockade will create shortage problems for the Chinese economy, as China no longer gets Venezuelan oil and is reliant on Iran and international spot market prices.
The war with Iran is now spreading to Yemen, with the Houthis attempting to replicate the Iranian chokehold model perfected in the Strait of Hormuz. The strategic importance of controlling or threatening critical maritime chokepoints is central to the wider contest. What happens in the Gulf can therefore have consequences for shipping, energy markets, and military calculations far beyond the immediate theatre.
So far, the US has declined Saudi requests to slow the Houthi advance. Neither Turkey nor Egypt seems inclined to come to Saudi Arabia's aid. This is despite the signing of a very recent mutual defence pact between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan.
More developments can happen in these conflicts on an average day than can be afforded mention, but they should be increasingly understood as interconnected parts of a wider geopolitical confrontation. Assistance in one theatre triggers reciprocal action in another. Consequently, these cease to be discrete, containable conflicts and are extending into prolonged multinational conflicts.
There is a distinct possibility that these may become frozen conflicts over time. A more terrifying eventuality is something more akin to the Thirty Years' War, which was fought in the first half of the 17th century in Europe.
It is important to remember that this calamity, which ravaged Europe, began as a localized rebellion that gradually drew in more and more powers. The initial religious nature of the fighting gave way to political struggles. The mechanism by which a localized conflict becomes a multinational struggle offers a historical warning worth considering.
The danger today is that a collection of individually distinct conflicts could become sufficiently interconnected that containing any one of them becomes increasingly difficult. Iran, Ukraine, Russia, China, the United States, and the conflict involving the Houthis are already linked by military assistance, intelligence, energy, trade, and strategic competition.
The question, therefore, is no longer simply how any one of these conflicts ends. It is whether they can remain separate conflicts at all.
(Author is an Israeli American lawyer academically qualified in British and in U.S.A. law, and a graduate of the School of Oriental & African Studies, London. He is a Jewish believer in Jesus and is currently based in Israel).
