The Spectre of Qatargate. By Rubin Rothler, LLB, LLM

The campaigns for Israel's upcoming elections are well underway, and investigative journalistic pieces have double downed on their reporting of episodes that compromise the different candidates. Netanyahu’s alleged involvement with Qatar funding Hamas pre-October 7th has featured prominently in this coverage. The so called "Qatargate" story was already leaked to the press over a year ago, but new evidence has emerged at least partially substantiating the substance of these claims. It is contended that Netanyahu was personally informed by both Egyptian military intelligence and his own intelligence czars, that large sums transferred from Qatar to Hamas were being used to fund the military wing of Hamas. This money amounted to many millions of dollars, and directly contributed a very substantial proportion of the money that financed the October 7th attacks. Netanyahu was apparently motivated to turn a blind eye by concerns that Fatah (the political opponents of Hamas) were gaining power and could defeat Hamas in Gaza. It was considered preferable to have Hamas in control, as Fatah carried international legitimacy that could quite potentially transform into a mandate for creating a Palestinian State.

Something more ominous and sinister, were the warning signs ignored of an impending attack. I recall reading a full-page ad taken out jointly by the different Zionist organisation in the United States in August 2023 spelling out accurately the manifold threats Israel was facing. If we recall, at the time an avalanche of protests against the government's proposed judicial reforms were convening on the streets of every city in the land. Then, rather conveniently the October 7th attacks put an abrupt end to this dissent and civil resistance. It is of course impossible to demonstrate a proximate link between these two events. But it doesn't sit well in a pre-voting political environment and feels eerily too consecutive in both popular and media driven perception. If we raise the question: did Netanyahu’s government derive a tangible benefit from October 7th - the answer has two aspects. On the one hand it delivered a decisive end to the judicial protests under the guise of unifying the nation against the common impending threat and perpetual wars since October 7th. Some of these theatres of action have presented Israel with the ability to carry out operations of spectacular success. Notable amongst these were the mass simultaneous pager attacks that decapitated Hizbollah's leadership, and similar success in eliminating Iran's military echelon in the opening day of the War. But on the other hand, Netanyahu’s former stellar reputation as "Mr Security" has unquestionably been tarnished.

In the absence of concrete evidence, it would seem conspiratorial to accuse Netenyahu of intentionally orchestrating a false flag attack with a coordinated stand down order. But such an outcome wouldn't necessarily require a formal plan. It would be enough to have a subtle meeting of minds in key positions to effectuate a lack of vigilance on the Gaza border. The very fact that such a scenario can be seriously entertained at all is testament to the prodigious gap left by the absence of a formal investigation into the circumstances surrounding October 7th three years on.

The combination of fresh revelations about Qatargate and lingering questions about how October the 7th happened does not bode well for Netenyahu. On the Qatar front, with some plausibility, it seems that Netanyahu placed his own calculations of political expediency above the security of the State. In any election cycle that would be damaging, but with what later transpired on October 7th many voters may consider this action damning.

The question now becomes, does the present scenario recapitulate what transpired in the events of 1973, when a surprise attack at the same time of year had political repercussions for the Labor Party led coalition? This resulted in the Nationalist led Religious Party led by Yosef Berg entering into partnership with Menachem Begin, and more astoundingly Moshe Dyan switching loyalties to the Likud, leaving Golda Meir's tenure untenable. Will the fragmentation of the Israeli Left that happened then, occur now amongst the Israeli Right?